free will vs. determinism.

free will vs. determinism. PHI 101, 4 April 2003

as Americans, we would all like to believe that we are free. however, does the word "freedom" really allow us to choose the path of our actions? we think that our desires are justified by our actions, but what about the idea that all of our actions are causally determined? how can we say that what we do is completely a reflection of our own free will and not the consequence of a previous act? what about responsibility? if all of our actions are determined, then how can we be responsible for those actions? are these two positions the only solutions to the argument for free will and determinism, or is compatibilism another possibility? essays written by Nagel, Taylor, Wood, and Stace can all contribute to the arguments and details for and or against these issues and attempt to unravel the uncertainties.

Thomas Nagel introduces the topic of free will and determinism in the book What Does It All Mean? his primary example in this selection for free will deals with choosing between two options. in this particular scenario, a person is given the choice between choosing a peach or a piece of chocolate cake. he states that this is a situation where free will is applicable because there is no inevitable force making the person choose one over the other.

in order to take on the determinist perspective, Nagel claims that circumstances that exist before we act determine our actions and make them inevitable. in other words, other possibilities are ruled out and there is no other choice given the circumstances. referring back to the peach and the piece of chocolate cake, if it were not predetermined that one would choose the chocolate cake, and the decision was made without explanation, then how could it have been that individual's own doing? if it was determined that one would choose the chocolate cake instead of the peach, then how could one have also chosen the peach? if all of our actions are determined, then how is it possible that we are able to make decisions if making decisions means that there ought to be alternative choices?

I believe that the combination of free will and determinism is the answer to these questions. the decision to choose the piece of chocolate cake may be one's own free will, but his desires are also an agent of cause. therefore, the desire to choose the piece of chocolate cake functions as the motivating factor, or the cause, for the free act to be carried out. on the other hand, if one has an equally strong desire for the peach and the piece of cake, he can still deliberate in order to choose one or the other, or neither.

Richard Taylor, the author of the essay Libertarianism: Defense of Free Will believes that free will exists, but only to a certain extent. in an attempt to justify this belief, he explains that human beings are sometimes the causes of their own behavior. however, he does not seem to support the idea of compatibilism because he claims that it makes no sense to ask whether the causes of one's actions (decisions and desires) are themselves caused. if there is no cause for our desires, then why would we choose to act on them at all? surely there are reasons for what we desire and base our decision on.

for example, if a man were to think about robbing a bank, there must be some rationale behind his thoughts. maybe he is poor and cannot afford to feed his family, hence he may feel that his family's needs are a plausible cause for him to steal the money. or even if he wanted the money simply to satisfy his own greed, he would still be making the decision based on that desire. in another instance, say that a man's wife has just gotten a hair cut that he thinks looks horrible, but he wants to avoid hurting her feelings when she asks how it looks, so he lies and tells her that it looks wonderful. the decision he made was probably based on his desire to keep her happy, not completely upon his own free will. his decision was swayed by the fear that he might offend his wife, so he used that as grounds to tell the lie.

in another excerpt called Determinism: Free Will is an Illusion by Ledger Wood, a new perspective is taken. while defending determinism, he rejects libertarianism. the basis to his argument is that all events are causally explained, and that whatever happens at any given time is the effect of some antecedent cause. with reference to Nagel's example, Wood defends determinism by stating that if two choices are equally appealing, then one would pick neither. but what if the person was forced to choose, or perhaps told that his survival would depend on whether or not he made a decision? say for example that an intelligent high school student is looking for a college to attend because he feels that a college education is an asset to his survival and in future career opportunities. if all the positives and negatives of two equally appealing colleges are weighed and he cannot decide which school he would prefer, it is highly unlikely that he would choose neither. it matters not which choice he makes, but the point is that he will eventually make a decision.

something that must be taken into consideration when discussing free will and determinism is the concept of responsibility. according to Wood, all of our actions are determined which suggests that we have no control over them. if this is the case, then how can we be held responsible for anything we do? likewise, if we have no control over our actions, then how can they be called our own? if universal causality is an unfalsifiable concept as the book suggests, then how can it be justified at all? just because the cause cannot be found does not mean there is not a cause, nor does it mean that there is one. therefore, it is necessary to reject the principle of determinism.

if a ten-year-old girl is raped and murdered, and we apply determinism to the situation, how can we justify the actions of the rapist and murderer? it would make no sense to simply state that his actions were predetermined so therefore he cannot be held responsible. of course there may be some underlying cause, but there must have also been some free will because the man could have chosen otherwise. but because he made the decision based on a set of desires, we have to call it free will. had those desires been different at that time, he might have chosen differently.

from a fourth perspective, W.T. Stace, the author of Compatibilism: Free Will is Consistent with Determinism, declares that the two concepts can, in fact, be reconciled. the first point he makes with regards to responsibility is that we must have free will in order to be morally responsible, yet our actions can be caused. if human actions were just causally determined, then how could punishments and rewards have any meaning? if we could predetermine a man's behavior as good, why would there be any reason to reward his good behavior? likewise, if determinism controlled all of our actions, it would be unjust to punish a bad person for his actions which he cannot escape. if he is not free to make his own decisions, then he cannot be blamed for what he may do wrong.

as the starting point for his compatibilist argument, Stace emphasizes the idea of free acts which are voluntary, and unfree acts which are involuntary. by relating free acts to internal causes and unfree acts (determined) to external causes, he illustrates his argument quite clearly. in other words, he believes that free acts are caused by psychological desires in the agent's mind while unfree acts are caused by physical forces outside the agent.

his most plausible example describes a scenario where a man on the street asks a man for his wallet and then threatens to shoot him if he refuses. if this situation is looked at from different perspectives, it seems that the free will and determinist arguments alone do not make much sense. if the man were to act according to his own free will, of course he would not voluntarily want to give the wallet up to the stranger. however, if, in fact, he did give the man his wallet to avoid being shot, it would most certainly not be simply due to his desire to do so, but more likely due to his fear. if we apply determinism here, it would mean that if the man gave up his wallet, it would be because there was a previous cause, which in this case would probably be the man holding him at gunpoint.

we can plainly see that both free will and determinism are necessary to explain human behavior. none of the decisions we make are entirely free because they include an antecedent of some kind. however, not all of our actions are based on just antecedents. with each decision we make, there is an extent to which our deliberation helps us make that determination; therefore, free will and determinism are compatible.